> "Preembryo"

> “There is no scientific basis for determining the moral status of human cells”

> “Nature discards a high percent of human embryos”

> “Twins”

> “The implantation constitutes an essential discontinuity in the embryonic development”

> “Moral status is unaffected by alteration: in order to block the capacity to develop into a baby, simply don't implant”

1. Recent data suggest that the earliest inner cell mass ICM (and even the morula) is heterogeneous[1] and contain a subpopulation of cells expressing the gene called nanog.[2]Only these cells, which in vitro would give rise to the embryonic stem (ES) cells, can become any type of cell. Therefore, developmental fate of the other cells is to a great extent established before implantation, and even before the 16-cell stage.[3]

2. Already before implantation the ICM cells are committed to produce a single individual; for example, in primates it appears that one cannot even produce twins by embryo splitting after the 16-cell stage.[4] On the other hand, also before the 16-cell stage the cells are committed to produce a single individual unless one separates the cells into several parts. Separation is a particular way of changing the developmental program of cells to produce clones. But one could also produce clones through reprogramming of adult cells. The possibility of reproductive cloning shows that also after implantation, and even after birth, no cell is committed “to the production of a single individual” if one applies appropriate engineering.

For these reasons we do not feel there is any more necessity to use the term “preembryo” for the stage before implantation than the term  “pre-fetus” before the 7-8 week period, or “pre-baby” before birth.

By contrast we recommend using the term “pseudo-embryo” to denote entities like the parthenotes recently produced by researchers of the Roslin Institute (Edinburgh).[5] These parthenotes are generated by stimulating human eggs to start dividing like an embryo without the addition of any genetic material from a separate source, such as sperm. Reconstituted parthenogenetic blastocysts can implant into the uterus wall, and develop till the stage when heart beating and blood circulation appears. Nevertheless, because of deficiencies in their differential expression of imprinted genes, they cannot go beyond and unfold spontaneous fetal motility.[6]

Therefore, the parthenotes produced by the Edinburgh team cannot be considered as true human embryos but should rather be considered to share the same moral status as a brain dead adult.[7] If one considers moral to obtain organs from a brain dead human body, nothing speaks against obtaining ES cells from such parthenotes. By contrast, destroying in vitro fertilization embryos to harvest ES cells is like harvesting someone’s heart before he dies. Parthenotes are non-embryonic entities exhibiting only an embryo-like development, and one should avoid considering them as embryos in the same way.

Joachim Huarte and Antoine Suarez

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Deciding about the moral status of an organism requires observable biological criteria. The definition of death as brain death, for instance, clearly establishes a transition point at which moral status of a person disappears on the basis of objective observable standards. Theoretically, one defines brain death as the complete, irreversible loss of all brain and brain stem functions. In the clinical praxis, one declares a body brain dead when it has lost the potential to perform determined spontaneous movements, as for instance breathing, eyes and legs movements.

By assuming that a brain dead organism is not a human person, we immediately associate personhood (or in philosophical terms, the activity of a human soul) with the potentiality for unfolding spontaneous motility. In particular, we correlate the activity of a human soul with neural activity as this reveals capability for spontaneous movements. By contrast, we do not associate the activity of the human soul directly with the activity of the heart, liver or kidneys, even if a lethal injury to these organs will ultimately also cause the loss of spontaneous movements. Consequently, transplantation e.g. of the heart cannot be considered equal to “transplanting” the human soul from one body to another.

Spontaneous fetal motility appears in humans from the seventh pregnancy week (De Vries, Visser and Prechtl 1982). Consequently, a gene expression program that makes it possible to reach this stage is an observable basis for deciding that the human cell is animated by a human soul, and deserves the moral status of human person.

An alteration of the gene expression program that inhibits the emergence of the neural activity responsible for spontaneous motility while permits the emergence of heart beating and blood circulation (a DIANA genomic alteration, see presentation) excludes the moral status. However, the fact that a human cell goes on to produce an abnormal and lethal growth in a very early developmental stage is not a sufficient condition to exclude the moral status of a person.

References

De Vries J.I.P., G.H.A. Visser and H.F.R. Prechtl. 1982. The Emergence of Fetal Behaviour: I. Qualitative Aspects, Early Human Development 7: 301–322.

See the videos at:

www.mamma.ch/de/hintergrund_embryo.htm

www.createhealth.org/dimensional.html

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A study in 1988 established that 31 percent of all pregnancies ended in an early miscarriage [1]. Eleven years later, the same research team reported that 25 percent of pregnancies miscarry before the sixth week [2]. It is hard to know how many blastocysts are eliminated before implantation.

Organisms eliminated in early miscarriages, and those whose development stops in the early stages, often show severe chromosomal and somatic anomalies. They could be compared to parthenotes or to androgenotes, and in some instances this is precisely what they are. This means that those organisms are eliminated because they lack the appropriate genomic configuration for reaching advanced development stages [3].

Therefore, regarding the status of the embryos eliminated in spontaneous abortions, one is faced with the question of distinguishing between embryos and pseudo-embryos (see presentation): Have they the potentiality to develop up to the appearance of the type of movement which reveals the presence of a spiritual soul? If this is not the case, and they bear a DIANA genomic alteration should not be considered as embryos, but as pseudo-embryos

In any case, it does not seem reasonable to consider as a person an androgenote whose development ends with the production of a hydatidiform mole. Since we have overriding evidence that the origin of human adults normally begins with the fusion of an oocyte and a sperm cell, we conclude that this procedure (fertilization) generates a human embryo, and the soul of this embryo is the same as the human soul of the adult into whom it will develop. However, today we also have evidence that chromosomal and epigenetic abnormalities in the gametes can lead to organisms with strongly altered developmental potentiality, as for instance, androgenotes. In such cases, one could rationally conclude that these abnormal organisms are pseudo-embryos, and that the fusion from which they originated was pseudo-fertilization.

Let us note that we speak here of intrinsic potentiality of a human cell, i.e. the cell’s capability to unfold spontaneous motility and not only heart beating through implantation into a well functioning uterus. It is evident, for instance, that a blastocyst possessing intrinsically the minimal developmental potentiality may not exert it in all situations (for example, because of a lack of a suitable maternal environment). In addition, in the state of current observations, in most cases it is impossible to know beforehand the potentiality of an organism, and the conclusion that it does not possess the potentiality to develop cannot be drawn unless it is allowed to implant in favorable conditions.

References

[1] A.J. Wilcox et al., “Incidence of Early Loss of Pregnancy,” New England Journal of Medicine 319.4 (July 28, 1988): 189–194.

[2] A.J. Wilcox, D.D. Baird, and L.R. Weinberg, “Time of Implantation of the Conceptus and Loss of Pregnancy,” New England Journal of Medicine 340.23 (June 10, 1999): 1796–1799.

[3] D.B. Maier, “Genetic and Infectious Causes of Habitual Abortion,” in Pathology of Infertility, ed. Bernard Gondos and Daniel H. Riddick (New York: Thieme Medical Publishers, 1987), 201–218; R.J.M. Gardner and G.R. Sutherland, Chromosome Abnormalities and Genetic Counselling (Oxford Monographs on Medical Genetics) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989): 175–177; M. Plachot et al., “Cytogenetic Analysis and Developmental Capacity of Normal and Abnormal Embryos after IVF,” Human Reproduction 4 (8 Suppl.; November 1989): 99–103; X.T. Zhou et al., “Chromosome Abnormalities in Early Pregnancy Analyzed by Direct Chromosome Preparation of Chorionic Villi,” Human Genetics 83.3 (October 1989): 277–279; S. Lehrer et al., “Oestrogen Receptor B-region Polymorphism and Spontaneous Abortion in Women with Breast Cancer,” Lancet 335.8690 (March 17, 1990): 622–624. J. Nichols et al., “Formation of Pluripotent Stem Cells in the Mammalian Embryo Depends on the POU Transcription Factor Oct4,” Cell 95.3 (October 30, 1998): 379–391.

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First of all one should notice that this objection makes sense only if one assumes that human individuality originates from a spiritual soul, since this cannot divide.
However, the assumption that an embryo is ensouled before losing his capacity of producing twinning by splitting is not at all contradictory. Indeed one can very well assume that at the moment of the splitting a new soul is created: the former soul continues to guide the development of one of the twins, and the new soul the development of the other.

Actually, as far as one assumes that reproductive cloning is technically possible also in humans, one also assumes that the capacity for twinning is never lost. Suppose one would produce several clones of me through Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer (SCNT). It is clear that the spiritual souls of these clones would not result through division of my soul, but would be new souls coming to being long time after my soul was created.

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Consider an embryo A becoming a girl, and an embryo B becoming a boy, both from the same mother. The embryo A possesses the potentiality for becoming a girl (and not a boy) since the fertilization, and not first at the implantation. Similarly possesses B the potentiality for becoming a boy (and not a girl) also since fertilization, before the implantation.

Consider now an embryo A reaching the stage of spontaneous movements, and a pseudo-embryo B (carrying a strong defective genomic configuration) reaching only the stage of heart-beating and blood circulation, both in the same uterus. As for the sex, the potentiality determining that the embryo A reaches spontaneous movements and not only heart beating depends on the intrinsic genomic configuration of the embryo, and not at all from the interaction with the maternal organism.

The interaction with the uterus is essential in order that an embryo A reaches birth, but it is irrelevant in order that A becomes a girl instead a boy. Similarly a well functioning uterus is not responsible for the fact that an embryo does not unfold the neural activity necessary for exhibiting spontaneous movements.

The embryo possesses the specific potentiality for the emergence of neural activity at the very onset of the first cell division. This potentiality is the decisive fact determining the capacity for animation through a human soul and the moral status.

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The fact that in a well functioning uterus an embryo unfolds spontaneous movements and not only heart beating and blood circulation, depends on the embryonic genetic and epigenetic information, and not on any information coming from the maternal organism. In this sense we say that an embryo has the specific potential to develop spontaneous motility.

This specific potential to unfold spontaneous motility (and not only heart beating) is the observable basis for determining when the moral status appears - similarly as the clinical criteria of brain death are the observable basis for determining when the moral status of a person disappears. If a cell bears a gene expression program that makes it possible to reach spontaneous fetal motility (and not only heart beating), this cell is a human person. The uterus is not responsible for the moral status, as it is not responsible for the sex of the baby, or for trisomy 21 (Down syndrome).

Conversely, the moral status may be affected by epigenetic alterations. An alteration that inhibits the emergence of the neural activity responsible for spontaneous motility while permits the emergence of heart beating and blood circulation (a DIANA genomica alteration, see presentation) excludes the moral status. Nevertheless, since Hurlbut’s proposal for Altered Nuclear Transfer (ANT) does not distinguish between DIANA and other genomic alterations, one should object to it: the fact that a human cell goes on to produce an abnormal and lethal growth in a very early developmental stage is not a sufficient condition to exclude the moral status.

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